On Value and Obligation in Practical Reason: Toward a Resolution of the Is–Ought Problem in the Thomistic Moral Tradition

Abstract

On Value and Obligation in Practical Reason:Toward a Resolution of the Is–Ought Problem in the Thomistic Moral Tradition William Matthew Diem "This brings us to one of the most pointless controversies of modern moral philosophy, … How can we move from the descriptive to the normative, from fact to value, from Is to Ought?"1 Introduction Hume's is–ought2 gap is, in the Thomistic moral tradition, regularly treated as being the same problem as the fact–value gap. The transition between the two is routinely just as swift and little-noted as that which the Scot observed from "is" to "ought" in the ethical discourse of his own day.3 [End Page 531] Further, these two dichotomies (fact–value and is–ought) are regularly treated as being identical, not only to one another, but also to Aristotle and Aquinas's distinction between practical and speculative.4 And the question whether (and if so, how) practical ("ought" or normative) knowledge is derived from speculative ("is" or descriptive) knowledge has driven some of the fiercest disputes among the schools of Thomistic theorists of natural law. I intend to show that both of these identifications are wrong and the debate has been misframed. The is–ought gap is not the fact–value gap, and neither of them corresponds neatly to Aquinas's distinction between the speculative and practical. Conflating value and obligation has resulted in an insoluble problem, but if, as I intend to show, they are both distinct in themselves and treated as such by Aquinas, then the possibility opens of a resolution—within the Thomistic school—to a debate that has, heretofore, proven particularly resistant to consensus. My treatment will proceed in four sections. I intend first to explain and defend the thesis that there is a fact–value gap: the bare understanding of speculative truth does not move an agent to act unless it first touches a desire or natural inclination. I will show that Aquinas is well aware of this gap and respects the distinction between purely factual knowledge and value in his moral psychology. Second, I intend to show that value and [End Page 532] obligation are distinct concepts and therefore the fact–value gap is not the is–ought gap, although—as I will also show—the two are routinely conflated in the contemporary Thomistic dispute over the relation of speculative to practical knowledge. In the third section, I intend to show that Aquinas clearly distinguishes between obligation and value, and in fact, he recognizes two clearly discrete forms of practical reason that answer to these two discrete notions, with each form of practical reason having its own distinct set of principles. Finally, I intend to show in the fourth section that, while conflating value and obligation led to an insoluble problem, conversely, once the notions of value and obligation are clearly distinguished, the is–ought gap poses no particular difficulty and the principal concerns of both sides in the debate can be answered. With these clarifications made, I will suggest a detailed, if tentative, account of precisely how synderesis gives us our first awareness of moral law from a prior speculative understanding. That There is a Fact–Value Gap By "value" I mean to name such desire or care for a thing as is necessary for that thing to motivate deliberate activity. Value—considered as that which is psychologically sufficient to serve as a motive for action—is, at root, a function of appetite or inclination: to value something is to desire it. Since "good" denotes the desirable, it is natural to use the language of goodness when discussing value, but because "good" is an analogous term, there is here a danger of confusion and equivocation, and as will become apparent, it is precisely averting such confusion that makes a discussion of the fact–value gap necessary. I readily admit that there are speculative or purely descriptive senses of "good" which are founded on our apprehension of a thing's teleology. A thing can be called good in itself, for example, if it is complete in its kind and fulfills its purpose or acts in a way conducive to its natural end...