On the vulnerability of face recognition systems towards morphed face attacks

Abstract

Morphed face images are artificially generated images, which blend the facial images of two or more different data subjects into one. The resulting morphed image resembles the constituent faces, both in visual and feature representation. If a morphed image is enroled as a probe in a biometric system, the data subjects contributing to the morphed image will be verified against the enroled probe. As a result of this infiltration, which is referred to as morphed face attack, the unambiguous assignment of data subjects is not warranted, i.e. the unique link between subject and probe is annulled. In this work, we investigate the vulnerability of biometric systems to such morphed face attacks by evaluating the techniques proposed to detect morphed face images. We create two new databases by printing and scanning digitally morphed images using two different types of scanners, a flatbed scanner and a line scanner. Further, the newly created databases are employed to study the vulnerability of state-of-the-art face recognition systems with a comprehensive evaluation.