On The Verge Of Being And Time

Abstract

BEFORE HEIDEGGER'S DISMISSAL OF BERGSON (ProQuest: ... denotes Greek characters omitted (or Cyrillic characters omitted.) There are few thinkers in history of philosophy for whom issue of more central than for Henri Bergson, who argues forcefully that philosophical thinking not a question of getting outside of time but of getfting] back into duration.1 Bergson's first efforts to challenge way understood in philosophy and sciences in Time and Free Will,2 preceded not only Heidegger's interpretation of temporality in Being and Time,3 but even Husserl's early analyses of time-consciousness.4 It unfortunate that more of a dialogue did not occur between Bergson and his German contemporaries in phenomenology, because of their mutual influence on some of most important French thinkers of twentieth century, but also because of their deep and abiding interest in issue of time. Also unfortunate way that shadow of Heidegger, a thinker for whom, according to David Wood, the question of not merely one of great philosophical interest as a topic for philosophical inquiry, but one that bears on nature of that inquiry itself,5 has fallen over Bergson, to whom same description surely applies. Heidegger bears some responsibility for relative silence surrounding relationship between his thought concerning and Bergson's. In Being and Time he calls into question the traditional concept of time, which has persisted from Aristotle to Bergson and even later (BT 17/39). Heidegger credits Aristotle with formulation of this concept of in IV, chapters 10-14, where he systematizes ordinary understanding of time as an infinite, irreversible sequence of nows.6 More boldly, he proposes that essay on first detailed Interpretation of this phenomenon which has come down to us. Every subsequent account of time, including Bergson's, has been essentially determined by it (BT 49/26). As such, according to Heidegger, Bergsonism mired in traditional ontology, and fails to escape metaphysical interpretation of being that dominates history of philosophy. Not until final chapter of Being and Time, in course of examining Hegel's philosophy of time, does Heidegger attempt to justify treating Bergson as an heir to concept of formulated by Aristotle. There, in footnote to §82 made famous by Derrida - in margins, as were - Heidegger's only substantial discussion of Bergson in Being and Time.1 Initially, focus of note Hegel, whose concept of time, Heidegger claims, drawn directly from Aristotle's Physics (BT 5007432?). Passing to Bergson, he levels same criticism: In its results, Bergson's view in accord with Hegel's thesis that space is time, in spite of very different reasons they have given. Bergson only turns this around, saying: Time (temps) space. Bergson's view of has also obviously arisen from an interpretation of Aristotelian essay on time.. Having regard to Aristotle's definition of as a???µ?? ????se??, Bergson prefaces his analysis of with an analysis ?? number. Time as space (Cf. Essai, p. 69) quantitative Succession. By a counter-orientation to this conception of time, duration gets described as a qualitative Succession. (BT 500-01/432-33n, translation modified) For readers puzzled by Heidegger's previous remarks about Bergson's association with Aristotle, this offers some clarification. However, rather than making connection between Bergson and Aristotle explicit, he stalls, insisting This not place for a critical confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] with Bergson's concept of time (BT 501/432n). It tempting to conclude from his hasty dismissal that Heidegger was not terribly interested in Bergson, or that he was only interested in preventing his readers from confusing his view with Bergson's. …