Abstract
Abstract The practice of make-believe has traditionally been viewed as valuable by psychologists and philosophers more or less exclusively as a mechanism for social initiation, a tool for everyday problem solving, or a method for children to learn about adult responsibilities. This instrumentalist approach has influenced the development of a wide variety of approaches to the pedagogical use of make-believe, from classroom experiments in play therapy to the influential "New Games" movement. This article examines the alternative hypothesis that games of make-believe should be conceived of as ends in themselves. It is suggested that a general explanation of the inherent value of imaginative play would provide support for Kendall Walton’s claim that to describe any artwork as representational is just to treat it as a prop in some game of make-believe. Also discussed are attempts made by Ron Edwards and Bernard Suits to provide general accounts of the value of make-believe. Their work hints at the existence of some surprising connections between this issue and certain broader and more fundamental philosophical concerns about the human good.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
