Abstract
We document a large and broad-based increase in the use of corporate governance provisions in the late 1980s. As a result, most large publicly traded firms have complex governance structures. This violates an assumption implicit in many empirical studies that provision use is mutually independent. While overall provision use is not systematically related to industry grouping, the uses of some types of provisions are correlated. Most notably, supermajority vote requirements, classified boards, and shareholder meeting requirements tend to be used in concert. Firms reincorporating to Delaware tend to eliminate cumulative voting, and coverages by certain types of state antitakeover laws are correlated. We also find that firms with poison pills tend to have relatively high institutional ownership, low managerial ownership, and a high proportion of independent directors.
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