On the Supposed Connection Between Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Logic

John Ian K Boongaling

doi:10.15388/problemos.2018.93.11748

Abstract

[full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian] This paper investigates a particular strategy for establishing the deep connection between metaphysics and logic using Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction and the theory of predication. The decisive move, according to this strategy, is to formulate and interpret the said principle as a metaphysical (or ontological) principle. In this paper, it is argued that: (1) despite the strategy’s initial appeal, a successful argument still needs to be made in order to fully establish that metaphysics and logic are deeply connected, and (2) the theory of predication is more fundamental than the principle of non-contradiction. The main reason for (1) above is that the strategy is prone to a very powerful objection that Aristotle’s criterion of primary substance is inconsistent. The main reason for (2) above is that the principle of non-contradiction itself is best explained using the theory of predication. In addition, it is the theory of predication that does all the important explanatory work in the context of Aristotle’s philosophical theory.

Highlights

Most of us will agree that, for Aristotle, metaphysics and logic are deeply connected
When we think of the supposed connection between Aristotle’s metaphysics and logic, a suggestion that naturally comes to mind is to link them together using the most obvious candidate that is readily available to us – the principle of non-contradiction (PNC)
While it is true that the PNC plays an important role in Aristotle’s metaphysics and logic, the principle is open to several possible formulations and interpretations

Summary

A Strategy for Establishing the Unity Thesis

After the demonstration of how Aristotle’s physics leads him to metaphysics and the discussion of the important role of theoretical wisdom in the process, the first stage for establishing UT is complete. This means that it is not possible for humans to belong and not to belong (at the same time and in the same respect) to the class of animals since the latter is the superior and the former is the inferior class (or genus) If this is correct, we can maintain that the PNC, viewed as a metaphysical principle, lends support to the idea that Aristotle’s TOP reveals a certain kind of hierarchy between and among the different categories in his system. In order of explanation, primary substance enjoys some sort of logical priority over the secondary substances At this juncture, one may suspect, and reasonably so, that the sneaky introduction of essence in 1029b10-1029b16 of the Metaphysics as quoted above, will have an impact, the chief problem that IO presents (i.e. the inconsistency of the criterion of primary substance) to the strategy that we are considering for establishing UT, and to the main explanatory tool at Aristotle’s disposal: the TOP. This result confirms what we said earlier: the TOP is more fundamental than the PNC as FT states

Conclusion