Abstract
We investigate the structure of fuzzy aggregation rules which, for every permissible profile of individual preferences, specify a fuzzy social ordering. It is shown that all fuzzy aggregation rules which have non-narrow domains and which satisfy the fuzzy counterparts of independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto criterion are characterized by a distribution of 'veto' power which would be generally considered undesirable.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
