On the Sociology of Science and the Continuing Importance of Epistemologically Couched Accounts

Abstract

I argue that there remains a significant place in the sociology of science for epistemologically couched accounts. By examining `strong programme' work, particularly Andrew Pickering's history of HEP, I show how the decidedly social aspects accentuated in sociological accounts typically have parallel epistemic aspects. The treatment of such aspects as explanatory factors often complements decidedly sociological accounts. This view is defended against the objection that epistemic norms or values are really of only secondary importance in comparison with social practice, perhaps only epiphenomenal. Epistemic values can be understood in a way that is compatible with an appreciation of the importance of practice. The place for epistemologically couched accounts is also defended by showing that generally telling objections to rationalizing explanation as it is commonly understood can be avoided in a superior, fully naturalist, understanding of such explanation.