On the semantics of artifactual kind terms

Abstract

AbstractWhat kind of reference (if any) do terms such as “pencil,” “chair,” “television,” and so on have? On the matter, a debate between directly referential theorists and descriptivist theorists is open. It is largely acknowledged that natural kind terms (such as “water,” “gold,” “tiger,” etc.) are directly referential expressions (cf. Putnam, 1975). That is, they are expressions whose reference is determined by their referents' nature, independent of whether we know or will ever know what this nature is. However, it does not seem likewise convincing that all artifactual kind terms (like “pencil,” “chair,” “television,” etc.) semantically behave the same. Terms for artifactual kinds seem more likely to be subjected to a descriptivist view, that is, definable not by links to their extensions' nature but in terms of conjunctions or clusters of properties. In his celebrated “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” (1975), Hilary Putnam originated the mentioned debate by arguing that artifactual kind terms also refer directly. Thus, the discussion ultimately revolves around establishing whether artifactual and natural kind terms are both directly referential expressions. The authors engaged in this debate have tried to argue in favor of (or against) Putnam's proposal by highlighting the similarities (or differences) between natural vis‐à‐vis artifactual kind words and their respective referents. This paper aims to provide a thorough and reasoned overview of the debate at stake, pointing out trends and problems associated with each proposed account.