Abstract

This paper motivates and develops a novel semantics for several epistemic expressions, including possibility and necessity modals and indicative conditionals. The semantics I defend constitutes an alternative to standard truth conditional theories, as it assigns sets of probability measures rather than sets of worlds as sentential semantic values. I argue that what my theory lacks in conservatism, it makes up for in strength — namely, the theory accounts for a host of distinctive and suggestive linguistic data collected and explored in this paper. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.8.5 BibTeX info

Highlights

  • This paper motivates and develops a novel semantics for several epistemic expressions, including possibility and necessity modals and indicative conditionals

  • If we start by studying the behavior of simple nested epistemic modals, we may naturally build a theory that explains the more complicated behavior of epistemic modals under disjunction and over indicative conditionals, and even the puzzling effects of embedding epistemic vocabulary in classically valid arguments

  • I set aside the possibility of resuscitating the standard truth conditional semantics for epistemic vocabulary, since persuasive arguments against that semantics have been discussed at length elsewhere

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Summary

Data for a theory of epistemic vocabulary

A careful examination of the behavior of epistemic modals yields several desiderata for a theory of epistemic vocabulary. A few of these desiderata have been discussed elsewhere, usually in the context of puzzles concerning epistemic modals. A number of the desiderata make trouble for extant semantic theories. The literature on epistemic modals is so vast that it would be impractical to argue against every alternative to my preferred theory here. I set aside the possibility of resuscitating the standard truth conditional semantics for epistemic vocabulary, since persuasive arguments against that semantics have been discussed at length elsewhere.. On the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary passing, but the main focus of this paper is the exposition and development of a positive case for my own theory

Nested epistemic vocabulary
Against contextualist re-interpretations of nested epistemic vocabulary
Epistemic vocabulary under disjunction
Epistemic vocabulary over indicatives
Epistemic vocabulary in classically valid arguments
A basic semantics for epistemic vocabulary
A semantics for logical operators
A semantics for epistemic possibility and necessity modals
A small detour
A number of refinements and explanations
The scope of my theory and avenues of further research
A Lexical entries
B Derivations
An example of ‘probably’ under disjunction
The invalidity of constructive dilemma
The quasi-validity of modus tollens
The quasi-validity of constructive dilemma
The validity of chancy modus ponens

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