Abstract
The paper revisits the security of the block cipher GOST, which is suitable for the protection in U-business services due to its simple design. Inspired from the reflection-meet-in-the-middle attack on GOST, we firstly find a large portion of weak keys on the full GOST: GOST has 2128 weak keys in which key recovery attack is mounted with a data complexity of 232 known plaintexts and a time complexity of 2125.5. Secondly, we present a differential fault attack on the full GOST, which required 64 fault injections to recover the entire key. This is the first known side-channel attack on GOST.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
