Abstract
The identity-based encryption scheme enables a sender to generate the ciphertext using a receiver's identity and system's parameters. Because of its convenience, the identity-based encryption scheme has been widely used in many practical applications. Recently, Zheng et al. proposed a new identity-based encryption scheme that operates without bilinear pairing. The authors claimed that their proposed scheme is provably secure in the standard model. However, in this paper, we show that Zheng et al.'s scheme unfortunately suffers from the key comprise problem, i.e., malicious users can deduce the private key of the key generation centre (KGC) through a coalition attack. Subsequently, the adversary can deduce any user's private key with the derived private key of the KGC. Our security analysis confirms that their scheme is not suitable for practical applications.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: International Journal of Internet Technology and Secured Transactions
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
