On the Role of Vision in Morality

Abstract

In his collection of essays entitled Vision and Virtue Professor Stanley Hauerwas has argued that the discipline of Christian ethics suffers from the wide acceptance of a conception of moral experience that is much too narrow. One consequence of this is that it becomes difficult to make sense of, and to defend, the thesis that there is a distinctly Christian form of moral life, i.e., a distinct subject matter for Christian ethics Hauerwas goes on to argue that it is important to recognize the centrality in moral life of such things as character, vision, stones and metaphors. Particularly, it is in terms of a distinctive vision that the thesis of a distinctly Christian form of moral life can best be stated and defended. However, when Hauerwas's conception of morality with vision as its central element is examined, certain difficulties become apparent. (1) It turns out to be just as restrictive in its own way of what does and does not count as part of the moral life as those conceptions of morality to which he objects. (2) It does not after all account for a distinctly Christian form of morality. Differences in vision do not necessarily indicate differences in forms of morality. And (3) despite claims to the contrary moral relativism is a consequence of this conception of morality. These problems are resolved in terms of an alternative conception of morality. According to this concept, the central element of various forms of moral life is a distinct kind of evaluation and guidance. Moral evaluation and guidance is distinctive in that (1) it is the evaluation of conduct, (2) intersubjective agreement is claimed, and (3) the principal criterion is the interests and benefit of others as well as oneself. This conception of morality allows for the possibility of forms of morality which differ from one another in a variety of ways. Given that a particular kind of evaluation and guidance is the central feature of morality, Christian forms of morality are distinct from secular forms of morality in that the former claim to be based upon divine moral evaluation and guidance, whereas the latter claim that this is not needed and /or not available. Both however share a commitment to moral evaluation and guidance, whether divine or otherwise. In terms of this conception of morality, current difficulties in Christian ethics are not to be traced to a too narrow conception of moral experience. Its principal difficulty rather is to be traced to its need to make sense of, and to make a case for, the reality and knowledge of divine moral guidance.