Abstract

Capital inflows have a strong presence that influences destination countries’ development of institutions, which can in turn help resuscitate a stopped economy and re-attract capital that was lost during crises such as the recent public health crisis. While the previous literature emphasizes the mechanism that foreign investors press or even threaten the local government for change, this paper explores empirically whether institutional improvement can be achieved through the channel that host countries voluntarily reform institutions in anticipation of potential investments predicted by the exogenous geographical and cultural characteristics of the recipient countries. Given that countries with better institutional quality can accumulate larger FDI stocks, we still find that the need for more FDI, in contrast to FPI and debt, gives higher incentives to host countries to strategically improve their institutions before seeking capital overseas. Moreover, the predicted FDI exerts more prominent impacts on institutions on constraining elite than those involved in launching a business, enforcing contracts, and protecting properties. The results imply that a long-run plan for upgrading elite constraint institutions is crucial for a post-pandemic FDI reboot.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.