Abstract

This paper documents that sellers who employ brokerage offices that list a large number of properties (“active brokerages”) obtain higher selling prices, smaller negotiated discounts from the corresponding list prices, and shorter times on the market for their listed properties. Sellers who employ active brokerages list their properties at prices that are closer to our hedonic model’s predicted prices. Interestingly, properties that are listed at discounts relative to their predicted prices are snapped up more quickly only if they are associated with brokerages that list a relatively small number of properties. In addition, properties listed by active brokerages are less likely to be listed “as is” and are more likely to have their defects repaired prior to being listed. Moreover, because the efficacy of brokerage services varies across brokerage offices, the results also suggest that the use of an indicator variable for the use of brokerage services is not sufficient to capture the complete impact of the use of a real estate broker on transaction outcomes. In addition, the Appendix discusses the concern for potential endogeneities between the number of brokerage listings and transaction outcomes. It documents that the Durban–Wu–Hausman test indicates that exogeneity cannot be rejected.

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