On the Relation of Pure Reason to Content: A Reply to Hegel's Critique of Formalism in Kant's Ethics

Abstract

If Hegel is right in his critique of Kant's ethics as an formalism, then it is true that this has devastating consequences for Kantian moral theory, and that as many have assumed there remains very little to be said in favor of Kant's formalist orientation. In spite of the multifaceted character of Hegel's critique, its most serious challenge to Kant can be narrowed down to two related charges, both of which appear in paragraphs 135-41 of the Philosophy of Right. First, as and empty of content, Hegel tells us, the supreme law of Kant's ethics can specify particular moral duties only if some other moral principle or content is presupposed. The implication here is that Kant is wrong to insist upon the thoroughly critical character of his moral theory. His efforts to demonstrate how the categorical imperative is sufficient as the test by which we may derive a substantive system of moral rules in fact depend, Hegel thinks, on the prior adoption of uncritical premises. Secondly, as formal and empty, the categorical imperative cannot place adequate restriction on the kind of maxim that may be justified on moral grounds. So, in addition to resting on an uncritical or dogmatic foundation, Kant's ethics also fails to provide a satisfactory criterion for determining the moral worth of our maxims. The first of these two challenges (which parallels Hegel's central critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy) is potentially the most destructive one, in so far as it is taken to call into question the internal consistency of