On the regulatory and economic incentives for renewable hybrid power plants in Brazil

Abstract

The complementarity between renewable generation profiles has been widely explored in the literature. Notwithstanding, complex interactions between regulatory and economic frameworks add interesting challenges and opportunities for hybrid power plant investors, regulators, and planners. Focusing on the Brazilian power market, we study the alignment of incentives between the economically-optimized strategy of hybrid power plant investors and the efficient utilization of the transmission resources. To do that, we propose a decision model that co-optimizes the risk-adjusted strategy of a hybrid power plant owner comprising (i) the forward-market involvement, (ii) the contracted amount of network access, and (iii) the share of renewable sources composing the hybrid power plant. We also propose adjusting the current regulatory framework to consider a unified calculation for the Firm Energy Certificates of non-controllable renewable power plants, including hybrid units. Based on that, we ensure a non-discriminatory regulatory framework for renewables acknowledging the diversity of generation profiles that hybrid units may have due to their optimal hybridization shares and network-access contracting strategies. A case study using realistic data from the northeastern region of the Brazilian power system showcases strong economic incentives for hybridization with reduced transmission resource utilization.