ON THE RATIONALIST SOLUTION TO GREGORY KAVKA'S TOXIN PUZZLE

Abstract

AbstractGregory Kavka's ‘Toxin Puzzle’ suggests that I cannot intend to perform a counter‐preferential action A even if I have a strong self‐interested reason to form this intention. The ‘Rationalist Solution,’ however, suggests that I can form this intention. For even though it is counter‐preferential, A‐ing is actually rational given that the intention behind it is rational. Two arguments are offered for this proposition that the rationality of the intention to A transfers to A‐ing itself: the ‘Self‐Promise Argument’ and David Gauthier's ‘Rational Self‐Interest Argument.’ But both arguments – and therefore the Rationalist Solution – fail. The Self‐Promise Argument fails because my intention to A does not constitute a promise to myself that I am obligated to honor. And Gauthier's Rational Self‐Interest Argument fails to rule out the possibility of rational irrationality.