Abstract
A research contribution focusing on the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)-enabled solutions assisting in the security framework of an optical 5G fronthaul segment is presented. We thoroughly investigate the integration of a BB84-QKD link, operating at telecom band, delivering quantum keys for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-256 encryption engines of a packetized fronthaul layer interconnecting multiple 5G terminal nodes. Secure Key Rate calculations are studied for both dedicated and shared fiber configurations to identify the attack surface of AES-encrypted data links in each deployment scenario. We also propose a converged fiber-wireless scenario, exploiting a mesh networking extension operated by mmWave wireless links. In addition to the quantum layer performance, emphasis is placed on the strict requirements of 5G-oriented optical edge segments, such as the latency and the availability of quantum keys. We find that for the dark fiber case, secret keys can be distilled at fiber lengths much longer than the maximum fiber fronthaul distance corresponding to the round-trip latency barrier, for both P2P and P2MP topologies. On the contrary, the inelastic Raman scattering makes the simultaneous transmission of quantum and classical signals much more challenging. To counteract the contamination of noise photons, a resilient classical/QKD coexistence scheme is adopted. Motivated by the recent advancements in quantum technology roadmap, our analysis aims to introduce the QKD blocks as a pillar of the quantum-safe security framework of the 5G/B5G-oriented fronthaul infrastructure.
Highlights
The 5G-enabled ultra-low-latency networks aim to open the door to the era of Internet of Actions, where things will be getting connected and becoming even more intelligent to provide service in a fully automated environment [1]
This strategy relies on the use of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) through unbreakable cryptosystems [3], as well on the exploitation of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) which is based on the laws of physics only [4]
In order to investigate in depth the magnitude of contamination of QKD links by Raman scattering photons in realistic network topologies, we considered two different wavelength allocations for the classical signals
Summary
The 5G-enabled ultra-low-latency networks aim to open the door to the era of Internet of Actions, where things will be getting connected and becoming even more intelligent to provide service in a fully automated environment [1] This new era of smart connectivity means that cybersecurity is expanded to physical space, with life or death situations appearing in critical services such as autopilot hacking [1]. Approaching the age of Quantum Computing (QC), the definition of a quantum-resistant security framework becomes a top priority for the 5G-oriented infrastructure owners and operators This strategy relies on the use of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) through unbreakable cryptosystems [3], as well on the exploitation of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) which is based on the laws of physics only [4]. The unconditional security of QKD has been ensured through several one-time-pad demonstrations encryption across quantum networks [6]
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