Abstract
It has become customary to think of Wittgenstein's late philosophy as a pragmatico-semantic underpinning for research in linguistics and AI. However, this view is erroneous since Wittgenstein's rejection of empirical reference and non-linguistic mentalism and his paradigmatic view of language games as games of chess and of meaning as language-intrinsic use effectively block such applications.
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