Abstract
We investigate the propensity of some simple voting systems to elect the Condorcet loser in three-alternative elections. Exact relations are obtained which give the probability of this paradox for plurality and negative voting as a function of the number of voters. Moreover, we show that, if preferences are single-peaked, then the Condorcet loser election is much less frequent with approval voting than with plurality voting.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
