On the possibility of quantifying scenic beauty — A response

Abstract

This article is a rebuttal to A.A. Carlson's argument ( Landscape Plann., 4 (1977) 131–172) against the empirical assessment and quantification of scenic beauty. The rebuttal is focused upon several ways in which Carlson misconstrues the intentions and purposes of practical aesthetic landscape assessments. Principal among these is that empirical or quantitative methods are not a substitute for a consi qualities, but rather are instruments for more effectively exploring and substantiating relations among aesthetic qualities. These empirical methods of aesthetic assessment are directed not so much at the pursuit of objectivity alone, but rather the generation of evidence to support the relationships upon which aesthetic assessments are based. Such relations may legitimately involve particular aesthetic qualities, such as formal ones, when an appropriate and important generic quality, such as scenic beauty, is the object of the aesthetic assessments in question. Furthermore, it is also valid to test assessment methods with operational-criterion measures, such as public perceptions of landscapes, when such measures are relevant to the qualities and land management interests that the aesthetic assessments are meant to serve. The possibilities of employing empirical methods to develop and apply aesthetic assessments are not limited by the weaknesses of any particular method. and relationships which might be researched are tremendously varied, as are the approaches to such research. The testing and theoretical explanation of these relations should not tend to simplify landscape appreciation nor supplant natural aesthetic sensitivities, but should instead enhance our understanding of the ae landscapes. This understanding can then also enhance our awareness of how environmental aesthetics function in our lives, just as it provides the basis assessments with which to protect the aesthetic quality of the environment.