On the Place of Imagination in the Architecture of the Mind

Abstract

Abstract Does imagination have a space in the architecture of the mind? More strongly, does imagination have an internal structure in the sense of having psychological processes dedicated to its operation? This chapter argues that it does. The author gives voice to one minority view according to which the psychological processes at work in the formation of experiential and propositional imagination are those dedicated to perception and language, respectively. He argues that this view forces perception and language to be directly connected in cognitive architecture, and this contravenes our best available cognitive neuroscience on the relationship between perception and language, which says that perception and language are indirectly connected. Using aphantasia, the author also shows that the other way around will not work, i.e., retaining the indirect connection between perception and language by forcing experiential and propositional imagination to now be indirectly connected. He then shows how stipulating an internal structure for experiential and propositional imagination sustains both the indirect connection between perception and language and the direct connection between experiential and propositional imagination. Unless some of our best sciences are wrong, it is best to say that imagination has a space in cognitive architecture.