Abstract
In this article, we focus on the conflict among the manager, the controller and the board of directors of a company. We model the problem as a three-player polymatrix game. Under a set of assumptions, we identify five potential Nash equilibria. We prove that the Nash equilibrium is unique, despite its changing structure. Next, we analyze the influence of the manager’s and controller’s bonuses and penalties on the Nash equilibria. Finally, we explain how the manager and the controller may decrease or maintain their performance, when their bonuses or penalties increase.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
