On the Perceptibility of Motion: An Inquiry from the Indian Philosophical Traditions

Abstract

This paper discusses an important issue regarding the concept of motion from the perspective of Indian philosophical traditions. We can recognise two camps in Indian philosophical schools regarding the epistemic means (pramana) through which one cognises motion. Some Indian philosophical schools claim that motion is completely imperceptible and one infers motion by perceiving contact and separation of an object with another object or space. Among these schools, we have considered Patanjali and Ramanuja (the author of Tantrarahasya) as the main advocators of this position. The other group claims that motion is perceptible and we infer motion only when the object possessing the motion is not perceptible. Supporters of this position are mainly the Nyaya-Vaisesika school and Narayanabhatta the author of Manameyodaya. While summarising and critically analysing these positions, we support the view that motion is perceptible by showing the following: (1) The position that motion is non-perceptible leads to some ontological issues (2) The position that motion is perceptible is more economical and simpler.