Abstract
The aim of this paper is twofold. We extend the well known Johnston power index usually defined for simple voting games, to voting games with abstention and we provide a full characterization of this extension. On the other hand, we conduct an ordinal comparison of three power indices: the Shapley–Shubik, Banzhaf and newly defined Johnston power indices. We provide a huge class of voting games with abstention in which these three power indices are ordinally equivalent. This is clearly a generalization of the work by Freixas et al. (Eur J Oper Res 216:367–375, 2012) and a twofold extension of Parker (Games Econ Behav 75:867–881, 2012) in the sense that, the ordinal equivalence emerges for three power indices (not just for the Shapley–Shubik and the Banzhaf indices), and it holds for a class of games strictly larger than the class of I-complete (3,2) games namely semi I-complete (3,2) games.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.