Abstract
AbstractThe chapter asks about the idea of animal rights and seeks to show that talk of ‘natural rights’ in general, where it is coherent at all, is designed to express moral outrage on the part of a third party against the abuse of the vulnerable and voiceless. This being so, it cannot be the case that to have a natural right one must have a voice or language. Quite the reverse is the case. The chapter also shows that the appeal to moral absolutes on behalf of the oppressed in respect of their most basic needs, for which ‘natural rights’ talk is currently the favoured discourse, is a longstanding part of traditional moral thinking and can be traced in the tragedies of Sophocles.
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