Abstract
This article extends the model of matching with incomplete information presented by Liu et al. (2014) by imposing exogenous restrictions on the beliefs of firms. The main result is that generically, there is always some game that contradicts the imposition of exogenous beliefs. This result complements Liu et al. (2014) by showing that their focus on stability for all reasonable beliefs is appropriate.
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