Abstract
Soulevant la question de la verite et de l'utilite philosophique des affirmations concernant une survenance globale de tous les faits a partir des faits physiques, l'A. montre que ces affirmations ne peuvent contribuer au projet metaphysique d'etablir une relation entre les differents niveaux de la realite, en ce sens qu'elle ne peuvent etre la source explicative d'une approche physicaliste de cette relation, malgre la transitivite de l'ensemble des proprietes definies par ces affirmations
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