Abstract
A model theory for a logic of both knowledge and belief (epistemic logic) is spelled out and defended. The chapter explores some consequences of the assumptions that motivate the theory, some alternative ways that the theory might be extended, and some ways in which this kind of model theory might throw light on traditional problems in epistemology. The main focus is the relation between knowledge and belief, and on some parallels between issues that emerged from the project of responding to the Gettier problem and issues in the more formal framework about the relations between the accessibility relations for belief and knowledge operators.
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