Abstract
We obtain a lower bound on the linear complexity of the power generator of pseudo-random numbers, which in some special cases is also known as the RSA generator and as the Blum–Blum–Shub generator. In some very important cases this bound is essentially the best possible. In particular, this implies that lattice reduction attacks on such generators are not feasible.
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