Abstract

Two correlational studies (ns = 400; 90) examined the association of judgments of immorality and disgust (hypothesized in much current research and theory). Across 40 scenarios in Study 1, immorality was positively correlated with negative emotions, especially anger. With anger partialed, disgust was significantly, but weakly, correlated with immorality, r(38) = 0.22, p < 0.05. Study 2 asked whether the immorality-disgust correlation is due to a confound: immoral events often include elements implicitly or explicitly implying pathogens, such as blood or semen. Across 22 scenarios, those implying pathogens were associated with disgust, but those without pathogens, whether moral or immoral, rarely were. We propose that the relation between disgust and immorality is largely coincidental, resulting from (a) using the word disgust to express anger with or even dislike of immoral acts and (b) the presence of incidental elements capable of eliciting disgust.

Highlights

  • Most of us find some events both immoral and disgusting

  • Anger and disgust were more strongly associated with moral judgments than were the other negative emotions

  • Disgust was not typically or strongly associated with immorality, we found some possible evidence of association, albeit weak

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Summary

Introduction

Most of us find some events both immoral and disgusting (for example, sex with a rotting corpse). Much theorizing and research in moral psychology today suggests that the association of immorality with disgust is more than coincidence or metaphor. These accounts are part of a broader enterprise in which emotion more generally, rather than just cold reasoning, is involved in moral judgment (Kagan, 1984; Shweder and Haidt, 1993; Prinz, 2006). Some theorists posit a role of disgust for the entire domain of moral judgment (Wheatley and Haidt, 2005; Schnall et al, 2008; Chapman et al, 2009; Chapman and Anderson, 2013, 2014). Some events are found immoral, at least in part, because they are disgusting: Haidt (2001) theorized that moral judgments are often post hoc Disgust and immorality rationalizations of gut-level intuitions, often disgust reactions. Russell and Giner-Sorolla (2012, p. 1) agreed on disgust’s causal role on moral judgments – calling disgust an “irrational and inflexible influence on our moral judgments” – and suggested that disgust plays “a powerful role in shaping cultural attitudes, politics, and law.” Focus on the role of disgust in moral judgment has reached beyond psychology. Kelly’s (2014) philosophical account of moral judgment adopted the evolutionary co-optation account in which disgust serves the function of avoiding socio-moral violations

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