On the Limitations of the Spread of an IBE-to-PKE Transformation

Abstract

By a generic transformation by Canetti, Halevi, and Katz (CHK) every Identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme implies a chosen-ciphertext secure public-key encryption (PKE) scheme. In the same work it is claimed that this transformation maps the two existing IBE schemes to two new and different chosen-ciphertext secure encryption schemes, each with individual advantages over the other.In this work we reconsider one of the two specific instantiations of the CHK transformation (when applied to the “second Boneh/Boyen IBE scheme”). We demonstrate that by applying further simplifications the resulting scheme can be proven secure under a weaker assumption than the underlying IBE scheme.Surprisingly, our simplified scheme nearly converges to a recent encryption scheme due to Boyen, Mei, and Waters which itself was obtained from the other specific instantiation of the CHK transformation (when applied to the “first Boneh/Boyen IBE scheme”). We find this particularly interesting since the two underlying IBE schemes are completely different.The bottom line of this paper is that the claim made by Canetti, Halevi, and Katz needs to be reformulated to: the CHK transformation maps the two known IBE schemes to nearly one single encryption scheme.KeywordsEncryption SchemeMessage Authentication CodeChallenge CiphertextChoose Ciphertext AttackBilinear GroupThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.