On The Liar Sentence: A Fregean Analysis

Abstract

The liar paradox, attributed to Eubulides, a fifth century BC Greek philosopher, has been debated over two millennia. In the history of philosophy, various attempts have been made to resolve and dissolve the paradox. Nevertheless, the paradox remains as a live area of exploration in logic and philosophy. The present paper is an analytical exploration into the validity of the strengthened liar sentence, which is considered as an acid test for all versions of liar paradoxes. The main method used in this analysis is the Fregean distinction between sign, sense and reference. The Fregean approach towards attributing the truth value as the predicate of the sentence is also used in this analysis. The analysis shows that the liar sentence is essentially meaningless and in a strict sense, it does not qualify as a sentence at all. Considering the liar sentence as meaningful, further analysis of the formal representation of liar sentence again proves it to be necessarily an inconsistent one. The formal analysis brings out the implicit contradiction within the liar sentence.