Abstract
We show that the least core of a TU coalitional game with a finite set of players is contained in the Mas-Colell bargaining set. This result is extended to games with a measurable space of players in which the worth of the grand coalition is at least that of any other coalition in the game. As a consequence, we obtain an existence theorem for the Mas-Colell bargaining set in TU games with a measurable space of players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.
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