On the kinship of cybernetics to Dialectical Materialism

Abstract

Up until 1954, cybernetics was for the most part rejected by Marxist Leninist ideologists. Since then, the attitude of Communist philosophers toward this new science has basically changed. This 'reactionary pseudo science', a 'form of contemporary mechanism'1 that was 'allegedly to pave the way for unlimited technical, economical and social progress', that was 'leading to humiliation and exploitation and spiritual poisoning of the masses', that was 'aiming at replacing Pavlov's tenets' and 'in a mystifying fashion drawing unscientific analogies', 'wanting to transpose one form of motion of matter into another'2, has become, on the con trary, 'one of the most impressive confirmations of Dialectical Materialism by a special science'3 and even 'the most important element of (its) contemporary scientific foundation'4. In trying to find a reason for this change of mind, one will no doubt first hit upon the growing relevance of cybernetics for technology, economics and production which cannot be disregarded, even by the Soviet ideologist. But its increasing impact on philosophical thinking, especially in the realm of Dialectical Materialism, cannot be explained only by this practical importance as a motive that made a reassessment necessary. As a reason that made the final acknow ledgement of the new science possible, one must consider a certain kinship of cybernetical methods or deliberations to some of the basic conceptions of Dialectical Materialism. The gnoseological realism advocated by Dialectical Materialism must, above all, be mentioned here since it is basic to the views of nearly all scientists in general. This consists in the instinctive assumption of a world of things which is independent of the knowing subject and which can be explored and described objectively. Furthermore, in Dialectical-Material ist reflections on philosophical problems of nature, this 'objective reality' is conceived as consisting of things as ultimate elements possessing cer tain inner and outer qualities and relations to other things. The essential role played by the concept "thing" might be shown with the aid of any definition of other basic concepts as quality or phenomenon. More