On the "kinship" of "all nature" in Plato's Meno

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Plato's seemingly casual remark at Meno 81 d I nature is akin has been interpreted in a wide variety of ways, and had varying degrees of importance ascribed to it.' Since it occupies a significant position in Plato's initial formulation of the theory of anamnesis, it is worth getting clear about. Thompson, Gulley, and Bluck concur in the suggestion it derives from Pythagorean (or some allied) doctrines. Thompson goes on to suggest Plato develops the notion further in his of the World-Soul in the Timaeus. Gulley, in a similar vein, while observing it is introduced to explain further how everything can be recalled from the remembrance of a single thing, describes the doctrine which it purportedly reflects as the view that the one spirit which pervades, like a soul, the whole universe, establishes a communion between Gods, men, and animals. However, neither Thompson nor Gulley attempt to make clear (what is not at all obvious) just how such a doctrine is supposed to function in this explanatory role. Bluck asserts Plato... is clearly thinking of a 'kinship' among all things makes possible of ideas. This conception is elaborated in the Phaedo (73 c sq.). One trouble with the suggestion the Meno's kinship is a precursor of association in the Phaedo is the character of the connection between things which can serve as reminders of each other, in the Phaedo account, is explicitly left indeterminate. It could be any real or imagined, arbitrary link, as highly personal or idiosyncratic as one pleases. Two things have the requisite just