On the independence of belief and credence

Abstract

AbstractMuch of the literature on the relationship between belief and credence has focused on the reduction question: that is, whether either belief or credence reduces to the other. This debate, while important, only scratches the surface of the belief‐credence connection. Even on the anti‐reductive dualist view, belief and credence could still be very tightly connected. Here, I explore questions about the belief‐credence connection that go beyond reduction. This paper is dedicated to what I call the independence question: just how independent are belief and credence? I look at this question from two angles: a descriptive one (as a psychological matter, how much can belief and credence come apart?) and a normative one (for a rational person, how closely connected are belief and credence?) I argue that those committed to minimal normative independence should accept more radical normative independence, and that cases of descriptive independence support belief‐credence dualism. This suggests that belief and credence are more independent than one might think.