Abstract
The paper employs a variant of Perry and Porter's (1985) ‘oligopoly-fringe’ model to analyse the incentives for horizontal merger. We consider several ways in which mergers may form, and their impact upon the profits of both participating and non-participating firms. We investigate the alternative regimes of collusive and non-cooperative behaviour in order to highlight the often perverse results of apparently straightforward merger activities.
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