Abstract

Let N = pq be an RSA modulus where p and q are primes not necessarily of the same bit size. Previous cryptanalysis results on the difficulty of factoring the public modulus N = pq deployed on variants of RSA cryptosystem are revisited. Each of these variants share a common key relation utilizing the modified Euler quotient (p 2 - 1)(q 2 - 1), given by the key relation ed - k(p 2 - 1)(q 2 - 1) = 1 where e and d are the public and private keys respectively. By conducting continuous midpoint subdivision analysis upon an interval containing (p 2 - 1)(q 2 - 1) together with continued fractions on the key relation, we increase the security bound for d exponentially.

Highlights

  • With the realization of the quantum computer coming into reality in the near future, expected in 2030 [20], the demise of traditional asymmetric encryption schemes is imminent

  • PRELIMINARIES This section reviews the fundamental concept of the continued fractions and presents some existing results relevant to our algebraic cryptanalysis method

  • Remark 5: In the case when the primes p and q are of arbitrary sizes, one can observe that the continuous midpoint subdivision analysis increases the upper bound of private d≈

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

With the realization of the quantum computer coming into reality in the near future, expected in 2030 [20], the demise of traditional asymmetric encryption schemes is imminent. In RSA key generation algorithm, the positive integers e and d are associated by the modular relation ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N )) where the Euler’s totient function or Euler quotient be represented by φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). A. Ruzai et al.: On the Improvement Attack Upon Some Variants of RSA Cryptosystem via the Continued Fractions Method. In 2017, Bunder et al [12] extended their previous work in [3] by considering the general key equation of the form ex − y(p2 − 1)(q2 − 1) = z where the unknown parameters x, y and z fulfill the conditions xy < 2N −.

PRELIMINARIES
For x a b
Solve the roots X1 and X2 of the polynomial
NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
ATTACK II
CONCLUSION

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