Abstract
A fundamental question in algorithmic mechanism design is whether any approximation algorithm for a single-parameter social-welfare maximization problem can be turned into a dominant-strategy truthful mechanism for the same problem (while preserving the approximation ratio up to a constant factor). A particularly desirable type of transformations—called black-box transformations—achieve the above goal by only accessing the approximation algorithm as a black box.
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