ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF A LOGICAL INCONSISTENCY IN THE GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME

Abstract

ABSTRACT Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory of crime is widely tested and commented upon and just as widely misapprehended. Criminologists have paid insufficient attention to the implications of the theory's rootedness in classical criminological and rational choice principles and its steadfast rejection of positivism. As a result, much of the beauty of the theory remains unappreciated. A more serious consequence is that criminologists have overlooked what careful attention to the classical and rational choice underpinnings of the theory discloses: the logical inconsistency of two fundamental claims made by Gottfiredson and Hirschi. This paper shows that on pain of logical inconsistency one cannot simultaneously assert, as Gottfredson and Hirschi wish to do, that rational judgment is the ultimate causal determinant of behavior and that variation in parental management practices explains variation in self-control. The proof consists of a demonstration that parental management practices can explain variation in self-control only if rational judgment is not, contrary to what Gottfredson and Hirschi assert, the ultimate causal determinant of behavior. Subsequent to presentation of the proof, implications are discussed, and the logical form of an alternative account of self-control suggested by the manner of resolution of the contradiction is offered.