Abstract
We use computational complexity as a lens to study the design of information structures in games of incomplete information. We focus on one of the simplest instantiations of the information structure design problem: Bayesian zero-sum games, and a principal who must design a public signal maximizing the equilibrium payoff of one of the players. In this setting, we show that optimal information structure design is computationally intractable, and in some cases hard to approximate, assuming that it is hard to recover a planted clique from an Erdős–Rényi random graph. Our result suggests that there is no “simple” characterization of optimal public-channel information structures in multi-player settings.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
