On the foundations of biological systematics

Abstract

The foundations of systematics lie in ontology, not in subjective epistemology. Systems and their elements should be distinguished from classes; only the latter are constructed from similarities. The term classification should be restricted to ordering into classes; ordering according to systematic relations may be called systematization. The theory of organization levels portrays the real world as a hierarchy of open systems, from energy quanta to ecosystems; followingHartmann these systems as extended in time are considered the primary units of reality. Organization levels should be distinguished from levels of differentiation within each organization level. Certain biological systems, such as species, continue to be misinterpreted as classes, particularly by logicians unfamiliar with modern biological theory. Replacement of Aristotelian definitions of species by “polytypic” definitions achieves nothing, because species are individual systems which can be defined from an ontological viewpoint only as wholes. The dispute whether classes (universals) are real per se or only in individuals is of no scientific importance; irrespective of which view is taken, any ordering of physical objects into classes constitutes an hypothesis about the structure of the real world. The distinction between essential and contingent characters (attributes) is relevant only to classification. There are no universal rules for evaluating characters for purposes of systematization. Character statements do not form separate linear sequences. The search for “unit characters” in an absolute sense is futile. All real characters are reducible to relations and are in principle measurable, although there are limitations on the extent to which this can be presently achieved. The concept of the sexual (“biological”) species is fundamental to theories of biosystematics. Sexual species may be defined as lineages consisting at any given time of series of populations between which genetic exchange can occur and delimited in time by two successive processes of speciation. Linnaean nomenclature needs modification; in its traditional form it is appropriate only to non-truncated hierarchies, whereas real phylogenies (lineages of species) form truncated hierarchies. In consequence of the distinction between systematization and classification it is concluded that, while taxa may be classified into age classes or evolutionary grades, their limits as taxa (systematic units) can be no different in either case. Classification into evolutionary grades remains an imprecise endeavour, since no general measure of evolutionary differentiation has been devised. The spatial and temporal extent of ecosystems, the postulated basic units of ecosystematics, remains unclarified. Nevertheless there are grounds for expecting progress in this field as the energetic relations between organisms become better understood. Biotic communities are not “abstract” classes, but systematic units. Physiognomic classification should not be confused with systematization of plant communities; both approaches contribute to an understanding of vegetational structure.