On the Fly: Israeli Airpower against the Al-Aqsa Intifada, 2000-2005

Abstract

Abstract : When asked to name one defining episode in the chronicles of the Israeli Air Force (IAF),1 historians and professional airmen would likely recall the opening salvoes of the Six-Day War on 5 June 1967. By the end of that pivotal day, the outnumbered IAF had effectively destroyed the air forces of three hostile Arab states, enabling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to overwhelm their foes and triple Israel s territorial holdings within a week. The IAF called this impressive accomplishment Operation Focus an appropriate moniker for such a determined application of aerial force against a numerically superior foe.2 Equally appropriate, the IDF refers to its participation in the antiterrorist campaign of 2000 2005 as Operation Ebb and Flow3 a term that not only evokes the seesaw level of violence characterizing the al-Aqsa Intifada4 and the IDF response but also describes the IAF s changing fortunes since the conflict began in September 2000. In contrast to the nearly legendary accomplishments of its past, IAF operations during Ebb and Flow may be best remembered for accusations of disproportionate force, controversy over collateral damage, and very public debates over targets and tactics. The 1967-vintage IAF knew its enemies and had trained, literally for years, to fight against those refreshingly familiar foes. Its twenty-first-century successor, however, proved unprepared to face a new kind of opponent in a new kind of war. Not until 2004 more than four years after Ebb and Flow began had the IAF adapted itself sufficiently to overcome these obstacles in an operationally meaningful way. It did so, literally and figuratively, on the fly, continually improvising its tactics, equipment, and doctrine to fit the new reality.