Abstract
A substantial generalization of Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence results for the usual continuum game model is obtained by the introduction of a new feeble topology on the set of action profiles. This allows for very general action spaces and no longer presupposes integrability of the action profiles. As a consequence of this generality, mixed equilibrium existence in the model not only implies pure equilibrium existence, but also follows from it.
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