Abstract

The EU Landing Obligation (LO) bans discards to incentivize a more selective and sustainable fishery. This regulation may induce a cost to the fishing industry that could be transferred to final fish consumers. We aim to assess the consumers’ reservation price for a sustainable and selective fishery. The methodology follows two steps: We first assess the value of the reservation price (willingness to pay, WTP) for a sustainable and selective fishery by using contingent valuation methods from a comparative perspective in Spain and Italy. We then attempt to empirically assess the components of WTP by using an original model specification that, unlike those presented in the literature, exogenizes socio-economic variables and uses ideological indicators to explain WTP in a two-line simultaneous model estimated by instrumental variable regression. The results show a positive, though low, WTP across the two samples, and very different impacts of estimated coefficients on the WTP for the two samples. A preliminary interpretation of this divergence highlights that Italian consumers consider LO-incentivized sustainable fishery a pure public good linked to issues of legality, and Spanish consumers consider it an impure public good linked to environmental issues. These differences may indicate how strongly the institutions and the policies in each region are perceived by a different human capital structure. They may also indicate that the problem, the perceptions of it and the solutions to it differ according to the context.

Highlights

  • The EU Landing Obligation (LO, reformed Common Fisheries Policy: EU Reg. 1380/2013) introduced a gradual obligation to land discards of certain regulated species according to a well-established schedule in different European marine regions, fisheries and species

  • We adopted contingent valuation (CV) methods that assess the willingness to pay (WTP) for sustainable and selective fisheries that are incentivized by the LO

  • The estimates show that the respondents’ stated WTP is positively/negatively affected by a set of endogenous ideological variables that, in turn, are determined by a set of instrumental socio-economic variables (respondent’s age; gender; job; income level; having a partner; and decisions on how much to spend on fish per month and how many times to consume fish in a month)

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Summary

Introduction

The EU Landing Obligation (LO, reformed Common Fisheries Policy: EU Reg. 1380/2013) introduced a gradual obligation to land discards of certain regulated species according to a well-established schedule in different European marine regions, fisheries and species. The LO aims to incentivize fishers to adopt more selective, discard-minimizing techniques for the preservation and conservation of marine resources. The LO will be implemented through discard plans that include the species covered, provisions on catch documentation, minimum conservation reference sizes and exemptions (for fish that may survive after being released back at sea), and a specific de minimis discard allowance under certain conditions (EU Reg. 1380/2013). The social costs of a sustainable fishery must be supported by private, though partially subsidized, investments. Fishers may transfer these costs to the consumers by increasing the price of the final product. Potential price increases are “green” mark-ups that consumers might be willing to pay in order to conserve and preserve marine resources

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