Abstract

ECoNoMIsTs have long since come to terms with the notion that their value judgements have no scientific status. But acceptance of this fact has not produced a retreat into strictly positive analysis; rather, it appears to have coincided with the emergence of the economist-adviser, whose role enjoys increasing public and professional recognition and who frankly avers that 'value judgements are an inescapable, obligatory, and desirable part of the life of an economic adviser'.2 It was not always so. Throughout the nineteenth century, when their discipline was struggling to achieve recognition as something more than a branch of lay morality, yet when they could display few of the trappings of esoteric inquiry, economists advocated a rather strict division of labour. From Nassau Senior and J. S. Mill down they argued that their function was to analyse the consequences of alternative courses of action. It was the prerogative of the politician to choose an 'appropriate' course. This distinction of functions certainly did not preclude a man from performing both, but it was incumbent upon him to make quite clear at all times in which of the two guises he was appearing.3 This two hats rule did not allay the fears and suspicions of those who thought they could discern in the gathering cohort of economists the forces of radicalism and irreligion.4 Nor was it proof against a determined

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