Abstract
In Aumann (Games Econ Behav 8(1):6–19, 1995, Games Econ Behav 23(1):97–105, 1998), time is assumed implicitly in the description of games of perfect information, and it is part of the epistemic distinction between ex-ante and ex-post knowledge. We show that ex-post knowledge in these papers can be expressed by ex-ante knowledge and therefore epistemically, time is irrelevant to the analysis. Furthermore, we show that material rationality by weak dominance and by expectation can be expressed in terms of the timeless strategic form of the game.
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