Abstract
Kalai and Kalai (2013) presented five axioms for solutions of 2-person semi-cooperative games: games in which the basic data specifies individual strategies and payoffs, but in which the players can sign binding contracts and make utility transfers. The axioms pin down a unique solution, the coco value. I show that if one adds a mild dummy player axiom to the list, then the axioms become inconsistent when there are more than two players.
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